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Gestalt psychologists emphasized the study of consciousness, like structuralist psychologists who used controlled introspection in sensory experiments. However, they emphasized that both perceived forms (Gestalten) and the experienced world are already structured wholes. They rejected the view of Structuralists and Associationists that consciousness consists of associated elements. For example, the reversible figure of the Rubin vase, which also appears as two faces, is fundamentally different from collections of sensations.  Later Gestaltists accepted behavioral wholes, such as the demonstration of an ape that uses insight to put together two bamboo sticks to reach a banana, instead of learning gradually through trial and error.  Though they emphasized consciousness, they linked it with the brain by assuming isomorphism. Classical Gestalt depended heavily upon the single demonstration or experimentum crucis, however by mid-20th century, Gestalt social psychology bridged experiment and social action. Philosophers of science debated the significance of the so-called Gestalt switch in terms of realism versus relativism. This raises issues of the foundations of scientific truth when paradigms change.
Prehistory of Gestalt in Philosophy and Medicine
 Although Gestalt psychology adhered to scientific naturalism and experiment, it had deep philosophical roots.  Philosophers following Kant began to distinguish the act of judging from the judged object. The proper object for idealist philosophers was not a mental picture but the entire object or situation.  “Cheetahs exist” or “it’s  raining” are unitary judgments of  a “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt), also translated as “atomic facts,”  which are not combinations of ideas in a proposition. Philosophers Hermann Lotze, Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein developed this critique of judgment.  In Berlin before and after World War I, Carl Stumpf agreed with William James that we experience a “stream of consciousness,’ from which we distinguish “mental functions.”  In visual space, we perceive location directly, not through muscle movements in the retina.  Two tones sounded together yield a third tone different from the component tones. 
In 19th century perception research, Ewald Hering challenged Hermann Helmholtz’s description of the eye as a camera in which we bring together sensations by unconscious inference.  A zigzag hole in a white cardboard can appear as a black patch or as a hole. Each perception has psychological reality as a “seen object” even if the retinal image is the same. Christian von Ehrenfels noted that one can play a melody in one key and then another key and immediately recognize the tune. Similarly, Austrian philosophers in Vienna and Graz contributed a model of cognition based on the Muller-Lyer illusion in which the length of two lines is judged longer or shorter based on illusions created by arrows at their ends.
In the early twentieth century, Gestalt psychologists experimented with tone color, figural aftereffects, illusions, and perceptual constancies. Brain scientists explored equipotentiality and mass action, behavioral neurology, and self actualization.  Social psychologists extended the Gestalt to social fields of force in a life world and to humanizing the workplace.  Gestalt therapists encouraged healthy contacts with the world through reorganization of self in a social field.  
Gestalt in Human Perception and Animal Insight Experiments
Stumpf’s students in Berlin, Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Köhler named and popularized Gestalt psychology elsewhere based upon a wide range of perceptual, learning, and cognitive experiments. Wertheimer’s classic phi phenomenon experiment used slits of light in a revolving tachistoscope wheel to produce a perception of apparent motion. Exposure intervals, as well as the color, arrangement, and size of the stimuli, could be varied.
Kurt Koffka introduced the “white tablecloth experiments,” where a subject encounters a white and a black tablecloth, but the black one has greater illumination. Subjects have no difficulty identifying that the white is white, even though the “proximal stimuli” of the black one are brighter. The subject utilizes a “color gradient” to make a Gestalt perceptual judgment. This involved a new understanding of stimulus.  A hungry fish bites the worm but the satiated one does not; the same stimulus object may elicit a different pattern of response as a “direct experience correlate of the stimuli.”  No hypothetical psychological processes are involved. In his book The Growth of the Mind, Koffka applied anthropologist Levy-Bruhl’s concept of the primitive mind to the child, maintaining that the child’s mind grows by differentiation, from the whole to the parts. In Russia, Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria drew on the work of  Koffka, Lewin, Tamara Dembo, and Anita Karsten, bringing a Gestalt perspective into their Cultural-Historical School.
 In the Teneriffe Island experiments with apes during the First World War, Wolfgang Köhler observed apes overcoming obstacles to reach a goal object  –  by stacking boxes. He and others (Carl Bühler, Charlotte Bühler) argued against Edward Lee Thorndike’s learning experiments with cats, in which a cat engages in random efforts to get out of a puzzle box, and the experimenter graphed the time to do so by a learning curve. Such instrumental learning abstracted from the animal’s behavior, whereas Kohler’s insight phenomenon has face validity.
Also in Germany, Kurt Lewin treated actions as “behavioral wholes” in which emotion and volition contribute to a specific situation with an end-product.  Bluma Zeigarnik and Maria Rickers-Ovsiankina showed that memory is better for uncompleted tasks. Tamara Dembo manipulated the experimental-subject relationship by causing frustration in subjects trying to complete an assigned task. 
Gestalt Social Psychology
Dembo’s observation of “firmness” and “loosening” of tension systems led to Lewin’s later concepts of psychological “life space” and “social fields of force.” Evgenia Hanfmann and Rickers-Ovsiankina took Lewin’s program into counseling, giving attention to the orientation of students to the clinical situation. The work of many Lewin students contributed to social action research in the United States in the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.
Lewin also focused on how the situation appears to the actor, and he diagrammed the needs of the person in different layers. He included motivation forces, as well as self and field, but opposed historical explanation by childhood experiences (psychoanalysis) or past learning (behaviorism).  Physics provided the concepts of field of force, vectors, and ahistorical laws by which social Gestaltists described personality and social fields. 
The experimenter first became a subject of psychological attention in Lewin’s research.  By contrast, contemporary research about character types and mental traits is abstracted from groups of persons and the experimenter is invisible. Lewin’s largely East European female research group had a cosmopolitan awareness of social psychological questions, recognizing that personality is embedded in social situations. 
Another émigré, Fritz Heider, proposed balance theory: if A dislikes B and B dislikes C, then he predicted that A would like C.  Or if a person likes President Eisenhower, and he did something bad, then one can protect equilibrium by disbelieving this report. Taking this balance theory further, Leon Festinger found that if students receive a small reward for giving a speech that contradicts their beliefs, then they are more likely to change their attitude than if they were given a larger reward. He called this “cognitive dissonance.” Heider and Festinger did not share Lewin’s emphasis on the Gestalt social field; theirs was an individual social psychology.
In medicine, neurologists Jakob von Uexkull, Konstantin von Monakow, and Kurt Goldstein, emphasized “holism” in brain science.  Some cultural psychologists defended a “racializing” National Socialism with ideas of “racial soul”, “purity,” and “folkish study of humanity.” Others built early careers by publishing in Nazi journals and weaving in statements of party orthodoxy.
       Since mid-20th century, many personality and social psychologists might argue that the historical approach based on frequencies can be joined with social field accounts employing experimenter-subject interaction.  David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, in their 1948 textbook, included historical frequency data along with group phenomena, however the emphasis was on the psychological states of individuals. By comparison, when Solomon Asch performed used multiple trials with confederates to produce a conformity effect in the subject’s judgment of the length of a line, the emphasis became the individual and the group; they mutually influence one another in socially-engaged psychological behaviors. Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Wood Sherif manipulated groups of summer camp boys to be friends, then to compete as enemies, and finally to reconcile through working toward a superordinate goal.  Their concern with the origin and development of norms marks them too as truly social psychologists, the direction Lewin had pointed.
Gestalt Therapy
       A vibrant clinical branch of Gestalt therapy grew out of the work of Fritz Perls and Laura Posner Perls (who studied color contrast with Gestaltist Adhémar Gelb in Frankfurt and co-wrote Ego, Hunger and Aggression in 1947).  Paul Goodman then wrote Gestalt Therapy with Fritz Perls and Ralph Hefferline in 1951. They emphasized the client’s “resistance” or bodily armor, drawing from their mentor Wilhelm Reich and from Jacob L. Moreno’s psychodrama.  In doubling or “hot seat,” clients kneel to symbolize the hidden aspect in their lives while saying what they would feel but never tell.
Since the 1950’s, Gestalt Therapy schools have arisen across North America and the world.  The psychoanalytic concept of  “mechanisms of defense” (Anna Freud) evolved into the restrospective “resistances to contact” (Perls). For example, clients may be asked to pay attention to bodily sensations while walking in a circle.  Erving and Miriam Polster changed the emphasis to “working with the resistance.” A therapist should look at the person the way you would view a sunset, with love and affection. One technique is mining for stories. A client dreamed that she and her sister escaped together. From whom, asked the therapist? From people.  From what people?  From our parents. By insisting upon concreteness, the therapist facilitates the client’s transition from A to B. Then focused emotional work becomes possible. 
Relativism versus Realism: Philosophy of Science versus Gestalt Psychology
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (1952) introduced the figure of a duck-rabbit. It can be involuntarily seen as one, then the other.  Relativists argue that the two pictures bear no relation to one another. For example, Tycho Brahe (a geocentrist), saw the sun rising; Kepler (a heliocentrist) saw the earth’s revolutions lowering it with respect to the sun. Wittgenstein explained this by sensory and intellectual contributions, a legacy perhaps of his ancestors in the Austrian School of Philosophy including Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. In another example, three dots are seen as a triangle; the dots are the sensory portion, and triangle is the judgement.
Gestalt psychologists argue that this returns us to the intellectualism of the tradition they rejected.  They are realists in asserting that perception itself is structured. Reality is given to us with a rich phenomenology. The conditions that produce this Gestalt switch depend on “definiteness” of stimulus conditions; if they are poor, switching may occur. Such conditions occur in everyday life, yet we perceive accurately.
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